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485 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS IN SECTION 8 
HOUSING: TRANSFER VOUCHER 
TERMINATIONS AND THE IMPACT  
ON PARTICIPANT FAMILIES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Currently, there is a procedural due process void in the existing Section 
8 housing regulations, which is having immediate, harmful effects on 
program participants. When a Section 8 Housing Assistance Program 
participant wishes to move, he receives a transfer voucher from the local 
Public Housing Agency (PHA). The PHA then has the discretion to 
choose not to extend the term of this transfer voucher, effectively 
terminating the family’s participation in the program. Despite the 
ramifications of the local PHA’s decision, the participant family has no 
right to a pre-termination hearing, where they can present their case and 
appeal to the PHA to reverse its decision.  
Courts have consistently held that participants in the Section 8 Housing 
Program have a constitutionally recognized, protectable property interest 
in their program benefits.
1
 In general, the fact that this is a constitutionally 
protected interest means that participants are entitled to proper due process 
before their participation in the program can be terminated.
2
 However, 
when the PHA allows a participant’s transfer voucher to expire, the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s regulations allow a 
participant’s housing benefits to be revoked without proper observance of 
their due process rights.
3
 
In Parts II and III, this Note examines the legislative and judicial 
context of Section 8 Housing Assistance Vouchers, including judicial 
decisions requiring due process procedures within the context of public 
assistance. Part IV then analyzes a recent case in Illinois where the court 
found that the local PHA must satisfy due process procedures before 
terminating a Section 8 transfer voucher, a decision that challenged 
 
 
 1. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Simmons v. Drew, 716 F.2d 1160, 1162 (7th 
Cir. 1983) (citing Ferguson v. Metro. Dev. & Hous. Agency, 485 F. Supp. 517 (M.D. Tenn. 1980); 
Brezina v. Dowdall, 472 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Ill. 1979); and Watkins v. Mobile Hous. Bd., No. 79–
0067–P (S.D. Ala. May 14, 1979)). 
 2. Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming applicants for Section 8 
benefits must be afforded Fifth Amendment due process protection in the application and selection 
process). 
 3. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(b)(4) (2002) (stating that “[a] PHA determination not to approve an 
extension of a voucher term” does not require an informal hearing). 
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persuasive precedent.
4
 Part V will then examine current legal and social 
trends toward greater accountability within housing assistance programs, 
and consider the opportunity presented by the Illinois case within that 
context. Finally, Part VI considers the implication of the Illinois court case 
and how this case might serve as a catalyst for judicial and legislative 
corrective response to this constitutional violation.  
II. LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT 
In 1937, Congress enacted the United States Housing Act to facilitate 
the construction of a public housing system in the United States.
5
 Over the 
next thirty years, Congress established housing assistance programs to 
assist “low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live and [to 
promote] economically mixed housing.”6 The U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) was given the responsibility of creating 
regulations for the administration of these programs.
7
 The resulting 
regulations are codified in 24 C.F.R. § 982.
8
 
The Section 8 Housing Program, also known as the HUD Housing 
Choice Voucher Program, issues housing vouchers to program 
participants.
9
 To qualify for a voucher, typically a family’s income must 
be less than fifty percent of the median income for the area in which they 
live.
10
 Tenants must apply for the program and are placed on a waiting list 
until the local PHA has sufficient funds to accept new participant families 
into the program.
11
 Tenants may remain on a waiting list for years waiting 
for acceptance into the program.
12
 
 
 
 4. Pickett v. Hous. Auth. of Cook Cty., 114 F. Supp. 3d 663 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 
 5. Angela McNair Turner, The Elephant in the Hearing Room: Colorblindness in Section 8 
Voucher Termination Hearings, 13 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 45, 46–47 (2011). 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2012); see also Turner, supra note 5, at 47. 
 7. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2012) and 24 C.F.R. § 982.52(a).  
 8. Although 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.554 and 982.555 were both amended in 2015, all of the court 
filings as well as the court’s opinion refer to the 2002 version of the regulations, as the amendments 
were not enacted until August 20th (after the court’s ruling). As there are no material changes in the 
2016 version of the regulations, and since the court’s decision in this case rested in part on statutory 
interpretation, this Note will to refer to the 2002 version of the regulations instead of the more current 
versions. 
 9. U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS FACT SHEET, http://portal. 
hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/topics/housing_choice_voucher_program_section_8 (last visited Sept. 9, 
2016). See also 24 C.F.R. § 982.1 (2016).  
 10. U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 9. 
 11. 24 C.F.R. § 982.204 (2016); U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 9.  
 12. In a national survey of Section 8 Housing, HUD found that the average time that a family 
waited to get public housing was eleven months in 1998. In large cities, the average wait time for 
Section 8 vouchers was 28 months. In New York, the average wait time for public housing was eight 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss2/8
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Once they have been accepted into the program, the participant 
families are then permitted to find their own housing, subject to approval 
by their local PHA.
13
 The local PHA pays a housing subsidy directly to the 
landlord on behalf of the participant family, which assists with a portion of 
the family’s rent.14 If the participant family later wants to relocate, the 
voucher program allows families to move within their local PHA’s 
jurisdiction or to another PHA jurisdiction without losing their housing 
assistance.
15
 Generally, the requirements for moving are that the family 
notifies the PHA, terminates its existing lease,
16
 and finds acceptable new 
housing.
17
  
While federal regulations govern the structure of the voucher program, 
the program is administered by the local PHAs.
18
 Every PHA is required 
to adopt a written administrative plan that establishes local policies, and 
the PHA is required to administer the program pursuant to this plan.
19
 The 
local PHA also has authority in accordance with federal regulations to 
terminate a family from the voucher program.
20
 For each decision a PHA 
makes to terminate assistance, the federal regulations dictate whether an 
 
 
years. John J. Ammann, Housing Out the Poor, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 309, 311–12 (2000) 
(documenting the waiting times for public housing and vouchers). 
 13. 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(2) (2016). Requirements for approval of a tenancy include: eligibility of 
the unit, inspection of the unit by the PHA, satisfaction of Housing Quality Standards, inclusion of the 
HUD tenancy addendum in the lease, reasonableness of the rent, and satisfaction of rent-to-monthly 
adjusted income ratio. 24 C.F.R. § 982.305(a) (2016). 
 14. 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(a) (2016). The amount of this subsidy is determined based on the 
participant family’s financial needs. Id. Generally, the maximum subsidy available is the lesser of the 
payment standard (the average monthly rent for a moderate unit in the local housing market) minus 
30% of the family’s monthly adjusted income, or the gross rent for the rental unit less 30% of the 
family’s monthly adjusted income. Id.  
 15. U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 9.  
 16. See, e.g., CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM 
ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN Ch. 5, 10 (2016), available at http://www.thecha.org/assets/1/6/Admin_Plan_-
_approved_11-17-15_effective_1-1-161.pdf. The requirement that a family must terminate their 
existing lease upon notifying the PHA of their intention to move has created some issues within the 
process. Primarily, some PHAs argue that because the family has terminated their Section 8-approved 
lease, they are no longer participants within the voucher program. Instead, the family has been 
downgraded to a more applicant-like status. Additionally, because the family must terminate their 
current lease before searching for alternate housing, they operate under a time constraint to find a new 
rental unit. While some landlords may agree to a month-to-month leasing situation, many landlords 
will begin searching for new tenants instead. Consequently, if the family is unable to find alternate 
housing, they have lost the option of remaining in their current housing accommodations because they 
have already given notice to their landlord. This contributes to families’ unwillingness and inability to 
move within the voucher program.  
 17. Id.  
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. 
 20. 24 C.F.R. § 982.552 (2002). 
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informal hearing is required before the family can be terminated.
21
 
According to federal regulations, the decision not to extend a participant 
family’s transfer voucher does not require an informal hearing.22  
The initial term of a transfer voucher must be at least 60 days.
23
 The 
local PHA then has the discretion to grant one or more extensions of the 
transfer voucher in accordance with its local administrative plan.
24
 
Additionally, if the participant family has submitted a request for approval 
of a new lease during the voucher term, the PHA must also grant a 
suspension of the voucher term while the request is processed.
25
  
 
 
 21. 24 C.F.R. § 982.555 (2002). 
 22. 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(b)(4) (2002). However, according to 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(a)(1)(iv), a 
decision to terminate assistance because of a participant family’s “failure to act” is a situation 
requiring an informal pre-termination hearing. Some plaintiffs have argued that their failure to obtain 
new acceptable housing before their transfer voucher expires is a “failure to act” under the definition 
of this regulation, and therefore an informal pre-termination hearing is required. See, e.g., Ely v. 
Mobile Hous. Bd., 13 F. Supp. 3d 1228 n.14 (S.D. Ala. 2014). This is an alternate interpretation of the 
federal regulations that will not be discussed in this Note, but may bear further examination if 
legislative action is taken. 
 23. 24 C.F.R. § 982.303(a) (2016). A family’s participation in the voucher program is otherwise 
not subject to a time constraint. Provided the family is not terminated from the program for cause, 
which is defined in the federal regulations, they may remain in the program as long as they remain 
income eligible. See generally 24 C.F.R. § 982.552 (2002) (PHA denial or termination of assistance 
can occur only for cause or for ineligibility). 
 24. 24 C.F.R. § 982.303(b) (2016). While the PHA has the discretion to extend the term of the 
transfer voucher, there is no guarantee that the PHA will choose to do so. Therefore, often families are 
working within the 60-day constraint of the original transfer voucher, as well as any time constraints 
imposed by their current landlord after they have given the landlord notice. This short period of time 
may cause families to settle for housing in “higher poverty neighborhoods with lower performing 
schools.” POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, THE URBAN INST., EXPANDING CHOICE: 
PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING A SUCCESSFUL HOUSING MOBILITY PROGRAM 8 (2013) 
(suggesting a longer voucher term may be needed within “tight markets”).  
 The practical effect of this is that families who are willing and able to move out of their current 
housing accommodations into a living situation that may be more beneficial to them economically, 
socially, and medically are choosing not to do so because of the fear that they might lose their housing 
assistance altogether. See also Stefanie DeLuca et al., Why Don’t Vouchers Do a Better Job of 
Deconcentrating Poverty? Insights from Fieldwork with Poor Families, 21 POVERTY & RACE 1, 1–2 
(2012). 
 25. 24 C.F.R. § 982.303 (2016). PHAs are now required to suspend the term of a transfer 
voucher while processing any request for tenancy approval. Housing Choice Voucher Program: 
Streamlining the Portability Process, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,564 (Sept. 21, 2015) (amending HUD 
regulations). However, in some cases, the PHA may fail to do so out of an administrative oversight, 
leading to a wrongful termination of a participant’s housing subsidy. See, e.g., Burgess v. Hous. Auth. 
of Alameda Cty., No. C01–04098 MJJ, 2006 WL 7347315, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2006). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss2/8
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Constitutional Protection 
Procedural due process protects against the unjustified deprivation of 
property. However, the Supreme Court has held that “[t]he requirements 
of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests 
encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and 
property. When protected interests are implicated, the right to some kind 
of prior hearing is paramount.”26 The Supreme Court has found a 
constitutionally protected right in public assistance, meaning that due 
process rights and procedures apply.
27
 Public assistance often provides 
recipients with the means by which they can obtain housing, food, 
clothing, or other living essentials.
28
 Thus, termination of public aid before 
a matter is tried and resolved would deprive the recipient of the financial 
resources he needs to live and survive while the matter is pending.
29
 This 
creates a deadlock situation that may be devastating to many recipients.
30
 
For that reason, before assistance can be terminated, a pre-termination 
evidentiary hearing is required in order to satisfy procedural due process.
31
 
Housing benefits, such as the housing subsidies provided through the 
Section 8 program, have been recognized as protectable property interests 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.
32
 Thus, termination of a participant’s 
benefits without due process is a deprivation of property in violation of the 
participant’s constitutional rights.33 The Seventh Circuit settled this issue 
 
 
 26. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972). 
 27. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 28. Id. at 264. 
 29. Id. 
 30. For a discussion of the practical and long-term consequences to families when they lose 
welfare benefits, see Lisa Brodoff, Lifting Burdens: Proof, Social Justice, and Public Assistance 
Administrative Hearings, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 131 (2008) (“[L]ow-income families 
frequently face hunger, homelessness, disability, or lack of medical care following the loss of critical 
benefits . . . .”). See also Turner, supra note 5, at 49 (“[L]osing a Section 8 voucher can be devastating 
for a participating family . . . . [L]oss of a Section 8 voucher can result in homelessness, food 
insecurity, and decreased access to appropriate medical care.”). 
 31. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 254 (1970). 
 32. “[I]t is plain that just as job tenure is a species of property protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, so too is ‘program tenure,’ the right of certificate holders to participate in a rent 
assistance program by seeking out persons willing and able to rent them housing pursuant to the rules 
of the program.” Simmons v. Drew, 716 F.2d 1160, 1162 (7th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). 
 33. Even an applicant to the housing voucher program “has a sufficient ‘property’ interest in 
Section 8 benefits to entitle her to due process safeguards in the processing of her application.” Ressler 
v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming that applicants for Section 8 benefits must be 
afforded Fifth Amendment due process protection in the application and selection process). 
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in Simmons v. Drew.
34
 In that case, plaintiffs had been terminated from a 
public housing program for allegedly violating their lease.
35
 They did not 
receive a pre-termination hearing from the local PHA before they were 
expelled from the program and their benefits terminated.
36
 The Simmons 
court held that the local PHA’s actions were unconstitutional because the 
program participant had a protectable property right in the housing 
voucher, and the PHA was required to follow procedural due process 
before expelling the participant family.
37
  
B. Procedural Due Process Requirements 
A recipient of public assistance, or similar constitutionally protected 
property interests, is entitled to specific due process procedures before that 
assistance can be terminated. The U.S. Supreme Court defined these 
procedures in Goldberg v. Kelly.
38
 Before his benefits can be terminated, a 
recipient must “have timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a 
proposed termination, and an effective opportunity to defend by 
confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments 
and evidence orally.”39 Written submissions by the recipient are not 
sufficient, as welfare recipients often lack the writing skills to express the 
situation completely and coherently in writing.
40
 Additionally, “the 
decision maker should state the reasons for his determination and indicate 
the evidence he relied on.”41 The decision maker must ensure that these 
procedures are followed to prevent an unconstitutional deprivation of a 
property interest. 
 
 
 34. 716 F.2d 1160 (7th Cir. 1983).  
 35. Id. at 1162. 
 36. Id. at 1163. 
 37. Id. at 1164. 
 38. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 39. Id. at 267–68. The Court held that informal procedures are sufficient, thus affirming 24 CFR 
§ 982.555, which allows for informal hearings upon termination of Section 8 benefits. Id. at 269. 
 40. Id. at 269. See also Turner, supra note 5, at 51 (discussing procedural barriers to pro se 
litigants, including that “Section 8 recipients may have lower education levels, limited English 
proficiency, or mental disabilities that make it more difficult for them to navigate a hearing and 
effectively explain their case”); April Kuehnhoff, Holding on to Home: Preventing Eviction and 
Termination of Tenant-Based Subsidies for Limited English Proficiency Tenants Living in Housing 
Units with HUD Rental Assistance, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 221 (2010) (discussing 
challenges that limited English proficiency tenants face within the complaint and administrative 
process for Section 8 housing). 
 41. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 271 (1970). This due process requirement becomes 
especially important in termination of Section 8 housing benefits as the participant’s right to a hearing 
depends on the grounds for which he was terminated. See 24 CFR § 982.555 (2002) (listing when an 
informal hearing is or is not required). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss2/8
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While courts have universally applied due process protections to 
participants of Section 8 housing,
42
 there remains a void for holders of a 
transfer voucher. Courts have found transfer voucher holders to have a 
different status than Section 8 participants, and thus have held that 
termination of this transfer voucher does not create due process concerns 
or a separate cause of action.
43
 Some courts have found that a participant 
family’s property rights in the Section 8 housing subsidies expire upon 
receipt of the transfer voucher.
44
 As a result, the participant family then 
has no right to an informal hearing in accordance with due process 
procedures before their benefits are terminated.
45
  
Courts have also declined to rule on the issue altogether, preferring not 
to decide whether a pre-termination hearing is required upon expiration of 
 
 
 42. See, e.g., McCall v. Montgomery Housing Authority, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1324 (M.D. Ala. 
2011) (“recipients of public assistance, such as Section 8 assistance, have a protected property interest 
in continuing to receive such assistance”); Swift v. McKeesport Housing Authority, 726 F. Supp. 2d 
559, 574 (W.D. Pa. 2010); Stevenson v. Willis, 579 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919 (N.D. Ohio 2008) 
(“Plaintiff’s participation in the § 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program . . . is a property interest 
protected by the requirement of procedural due process.”); Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 
425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970); Junior v. City of New York, Housing Preservation and Development 
Corp., 2013 WL 646464, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2013) (“It is well established that Section 8 tenants 
have a property interest in continuing to receive assistance payments.”). 
 43. See, e.g., Jackson v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., No. 7:13-CV-155-BO, 2014 WL 2506151, at 
*4 (E.D.N.C. June 3, 2014) (holding participant’s property rights expired upon receipt of the transfer 
voucher). Similarly, some courts distinguish between applicants to the Section 8 Housing Program and 
participants in the program. Compare Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that 
Section 8 applicants had property interests in the housing subsidies) with Eidson v. Pierce, 745 F.2d 
453 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that applicants did not have property interests in the subsidies and thus 
due process procedures did not have to be implemented). The Supreme Court recognizes property 
rights when there is a legitimate claim of entitlement to the property interest; but the fact that the 
family is issued a voucher does not change their reasonable expectation that they will remain in the 
program. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.305 (procedures and requirements for PHA approval of a participant 
family’s request for tenancy assistance); 24 C.F.R. § 982.355(b) (“A receiving PHA cannot refuse to 
assist incoming portable families or direct them to another neighboring PHA for assistance.”). Thus, 
defining their status differently seems to be an arbitrary distinction. 
 44. Jackson, 2014 WL 2506151, at *4. See also Burgess v. Alameda Hous. Auth., 98 F. App’x 
603, 605 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s due process claim by 
finding no property interest in the transfer voucher). But see Burgess v. Hous. Auth. of Alameda Cty., 
No. C01–04098 MJJ, 2006 WL 7347315, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2006) (on remand, finding 
plaintiff has a “recognized, protectable property interest in Section 8 benefits”). 
 45. See, e.g., Ely v. Mobile Hous. Bd., 13 F. Supp. 3d 1216 (S.D. Ala. 2014). A participant 
family who received a transfer voucher failed to submit an acceptable lease before the voucher 
expired. Id. at 1222. The housing authority terminated the family’s transfer voucher and the family 
was removed from the voucher program. Id. at 1223–24. The court found that the participant family 
did not have a property interest after their transfer voucher expired and thus was not entitled to a due 
process hearing. Id. at 1226. This logic seems contradictory, however, as merely terminating any 
public assistance recipient’s benefits would then allow the decision-maker to avoid having to follow 
due process procedures. In essence, the improper termination of a recipient’s benefits protects the 
decision-maker from having to follow correct procedures for termination because it removes the 
participant’s status as a property interest holder.  
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a transfer voucher.
46
 This suggests that the issue has not yet been settled, 
and there might be constitutional issues implicated that courts have 
preferred not to touch.
47
 Many times these challenges are brought in state 
court, even though they address a federal constitutional issue, meaning the 
courts may not want to rule on an issue more appropriately addressed in 
federal court. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF PICKETT 
The issue of the constitutionality of a participant’s program termination 
for an expired transfer voucher was recently raised in the Northern District 
of Illinois. In Pickett v. Housing Authority of Cook County,
48
 the court 
found that the local PHA’s refusal to provide a hearing to a participant 
family whose transfer voucher expired constituted a violation of 
procedural due process rights.
49
 This was the first case where a court found 
that the participant family’s property interest in the Section 8 voucher 
required a due process hearing before it could be terminated.
50
 
In Pickett, Charlise Pickett and her family had been part of the Section 
8 voucher program for nine years.
51
 At that time, Pickett sought to move to 
a new living space to accommodate her larger family, which had grown 
from two minor children to four.
52
 Pickett began looking for housing, but 
due to circumstances outside of her control, had to seek several extensions 
 
 
 46. See Moore v. Hunt, No. 14–CV–1101–JPS, 2015 WL 5008265 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 20, 2015). A 
program participant was issued a transfer voucher after her lease was terminated. Id. at *3. The 
participant requested but was denied a hearing when the local PHA terminated her transfer voucher 
and she was removed from the program. Id. at *4. The court declined to rule on whether termination 
for expiration of a voucher requires a written response or a hearing. Id. at *12 n.5. 
 47. See Stevenson v. Willis, 579 F. Supp. 2d 913, 923 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (“Just as tenants can 
challenge a rent calculation, they should also be able to challenge procedures for termination of the 
subsidy altogether.”); David A. Thomas, Fixing Up Fair Housing Laws: Are We Ready for Reform?, 
53 S.C. L. REV. 7 (2001) (critiquing the constitutional authority of the Fair Housing Act and arguing 
for changes to bring it into greater constitutional compliance). See also Michael Zmora, Between 
Rucker and a Hard Place: The Due Process Void for Section 8 Voucher Holders in No-Fault 
Evictions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1961 (2009) (discussing due process concerns in Section 8 housing that 
courts have declined to settle as of yet because of the complexity of the constitutional issue). 
 48. 114 F. Supp. 3d 663 (N.D. Ill. 2015). The participant was granted a transfer voucher but 
failed to find acceptable housing before the voucher expired. Id. at 666. The local housing authority 
found that the participant’s property rights expired upon receipt of the transfer voucher and thus the 
participant had no right to a pre-termination hearing when the PHA declined to extend the terms of the 
voucher, thus terminating the participant’s program participation. Id. at 667. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id. at 670 n.6 (“The court acknowledges that its ruling diverges from precedent in other 
circuits.”). 
 51. Id. at 665. 
 52. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss2/8
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of her transfer voucher, all of which were approved by the Housing 
Authority of Cook County (HACC).
53
  
After several attempts to sign a new lease were unsuccessful, Pickett 
eventually located a new unit and submitted her tenancy request form to 
HACC on August 27, 2013, but her request was missing a form 
demonstrating ownership of the property.
54
 Pickett was told by HACC that 
she had missed the deadline by a few days, but she could have three more 
days to submit all of the required documents.
55
 Pickett attempted to obtain 
the necessary information from her landlord the next day, but discovered 
he had chosen to rent to a non-voucher family instead.
56
  
On August 30, 2013, Pickett returned to the HACC office to explain 
her situation and request additional time to submit the required 
documents.
57
 HACC denied this request and gave her a notice of 
termination.
58
 Pickett submitted a written request to appeal HACC’s 
decision to terminate her voucher in September 2013.
59
 Pickett received a 
response from HACC in December 2013.
60
  
The letter from HACC denied Pickett’s request to appeal the decision 
terminating her participation in the Section 8 voucher program.
61
 The 
reason that the letter gave was: “Other: [Pickett was] issued five 
extensions on [her] voucher search and had moving papers from May 2012 
until August 2013 and [she] did not successfully locate a unit for approval 
 
 
 53. Id. at 666. In September 2012, Pickett found a landlord willing to rent her a unit. Once 
HACC approved the property in January 2013, Pickett and her family moved into the house in 
February 2013. However, after moving in, Pickett learned that her landlord was unwilling to execute a 
lease or sign the required contract with HACC. Upon discovery of this information in May 2013, 
Pickett sought an extension of her voucher, which HACC approved for a term of thirty days. In July 
2013, Pickett sought a second thirty-day extension, which HACC also approved. Later that month, 
Pickett located another rental unit and submitted the required paperwork to HACC. The landlord of 
that property wanted Pickett to move in immediately, but Pickett informed him that she could not until 
she received HACC’s approval. The landlord subsequently decided not to rent to Pickett, leaving 
Pickett with twelve days remaining on her transfer voucher. Id. 
 54. Id. Pickett also alleged that HACC failed to suspend the term of her transfer voucher while 
her request for tenancy approval was pending. Id.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 667. Although the letter from HACC was dated November 15, 2013, it had been sent to 
a location other than Pickett’s residence. Id. at 666. In fact, it had been sent to one of the rental 
locations that Pickett had submitted to HACC for approval, but where she had never actually resided. 
Id. 
 61. Id. at 667. 
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before the extended expiration date of [her] voucher.”62 As a result of her 
termination, Pickett sued HACC
63
 and the executive director of HACC for 
“terminat[ing] her housing voucher without cause and without an 
opportunity for hearing in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and the Housing Act of 1937.”64 She sought 
declaratory judgment,
65
 injunctive relief,
66
 and monetary damages.  
A. Count I: Violation of Due Process 
Pickett’s first allegation was that HACC’s decision to terminate her 
from the voucher program was a violation of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.
67
 The Due Process Clause requires a hearing 
prior to termination of a subsidy that provides benefits necessary for 
subsistence, such as a housing voucher.
68
 Pickett argued that once she was 
accepted into the voucher program, she “possessed a property interest in 
continuing to receive rental assistance” and thus was entitled to due 
 
 
 62. Id. (citing Plaintiff’s Complaint). The court also stated that it was notable that the first two 
form reasons that HACC could have given for denying the termination were not checked in the letter 
to Pickett; namely that “[Pickett’s] request was received after the deadline for an appeal” or “[t]he 
reason for request does not require an informal hearing.” Id. at 669. This suggests that HACC made its 
decision to terminate based solely or primarily on the fact that Pickett failed to locate a suitable unit 
before expiration of the transfer voucher. This lends credence to the argument that Pickett later made 
that as a termination for “failure to act,” she properly should have been given an informal hearing 
under the guidelines of the federal regulations. Id. at 670. 
 63. Although Pickett could have chosen to sue the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development instead, since HUD leaves the practicalities of implementing the federal regulations to 
the local PHAs, Pickett sued HACC on the basis of improper implementation of those regulations. 
Since all local PHAs must adopt these same regulations, this allows the Pickett decision to have 
applicability beyond the boundaries of Cook County, IL. See 24 C.F.R. §982.153 (“[t]he PHA must 
comply with . . . HUD regulations”). 
 64. Pickett, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 665. 
 65. Complaint at 1, Pickett v. Hous. Auth. of Cook Cty., 114 F. Supp. 3d 663 (N.D. Ill. 2015) 
(No. 1:15-CV-00749) [hereinafter Complaint]. Pickett sought declaratory judgment on three issues: 
(1) Failure to provide a voucher program participant with notice and a pre-termination hearing is a 
violation of the participant’s due process rights; (2) Termination of participation in a voucher program 
for expiration of a transfer voucher on grounds other than those in 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.553 (b) and (c) 
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) Failure to provide a voucher 
program participant with notice and a pre-termination hearing violates 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k) and 24 
C.F.R. §§ 982.553(b) and 982.555(a)(2) and (d)(2). Complaint at 12–13. 
 66. Id. at 12–13. Pickett sought to enjoin HACC from terminating her from the voucher program 
without granting her due process and without a proper basis for termination. Id. at 13. This injunction 
was important in her case because the loss of the housing subsidy while the case was proceeding could 
have had devastating effects. Pickett, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 673. 
 67. Complaint at 10. 
 68. Simmons v. Drew, 716 F.2d 1160, 1162 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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process before HACC effectively withdrew and terminated the subsidy.
69
 
Only a pre-termination hearing provides proper due process when benefits 
for essential needs are discontinued.
70
 Thus, Pickett argued that she was 
entitled to a pre-termination hearing.
71
 Since HACC did not terminate her 
for one of the grounds enumerated in 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.553(b) and (c) and 
did not provide her with a pre-termination hearing, Pickett alleged that 
HACC acted under the color of law to deprive her of her property right, 
thus violating due process.
72
  
B. Count II: Violation of Housing Act of 1937 
Second, Pickett alleged that HACC violated the Housing Act of 1937 
by terminating her housing voucher without providing her with proper 
notice of its decision or an opportunity for a pre-termination hearing.
73
 
Furthermore, Pickett alleged that HACC did not terminate her for one of 
the grounds enumerated in 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.553(b) and (c), but rather on 
the basis of “expiration.”74  
HACC argued it had the discretion to decide whether to extend the 
voucher or not.
75
 Furthermore, under federal regulations, HACC argued 
that a hearing is not required for a PHA determination to deny an 
extension or suspension of a voucher term.
76
 In response to Pickett’s 
complaint, HACC filed a motion to dismiss. 
 
 
 69. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Request for Preliminary Injunction at 8, Pickett v. 
Hous. Auth. of Cook Cty., 114 F. Supp. 3d 663 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (No. 1:15-CV-00749). 
 70. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–65 (1970). 
 71. Pickett, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 665. 
 72. Complaint at 10–11. 
 73. Id. at 10. 
 74. Id. at 10–11. 
 75. Pickett, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 671. HACC also made another argument based on the nature of 
the transfer voucher and Pickett’s status within the voucher program. HACC argued that once a 
transfer voucher was issued to a participant family, the family’s status as a program participant was 
technically suspended pending HACC approval of a new tenancy. Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 10–12, Pickett v. Hous. Auth. of Cook Cty., 114 F. Supp. 3d 663 
(N.D. Ill. 2015) (No. 1:15-CV-00749). Thus, the family’s status was more similar to that of an 
“applicant,” or a family who had just been approved for the program from the wait list but had not yet 
found or been approved for a residence. Id. HUD regulations distinguish “applicants,” those who have 
not signed a lease approved by PHA, from “participants,” or those families who have already been 
living in PHA-approved and subsidized housing. Compare 24 C.F.R. § 982.554 (2002) (“[i]nformal 
review for applicant”) with 24 C.F.R. § 982.555 (2002) (“[I]nformal hearing for participant”). 
Participant families have greater rights than applicants, including the opportunity for a hearing prior to 
termination based on a family’s action or failure to act. For a more thorough discussion of this 
argument, and the idea that a participant’s property rights expire upon receipt of the transfer voucher, 
see Jackson v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., No. 7:13–CV–155–BO, 2014 WL 2506151 (E.D.N.C. June 3, 
2014); Ely v. Mobile Hous. Bd., 13 F. Supp. 3d 1216 (S.D. Ala. 2014).  
 76. 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(b)(4) (2002).  
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C. Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order 
The court denied HACC’s motion to dismiss and granted Pickett’s 
motion for a preliminary injunction, requiring HACC to hold a hearing on 
its decision to terminate Pickett’s participation in the program.77  
1. Count I: Procedural Due Process 
The court held that participants who have received rental assistance 
through the Section 8 Housing Program have a property interest in the 
assistance because they have a legitimate expectation of a continued 
benefit that was subject to expiration.
78
 Thus, HACC’s refusal to provide a 
hearing to a participant whose voucher expired constitutes a violation of 
procedural due process.
79
 Instead, the court held that HACC must give a 
transfer voucher holder the right to a hearing before termination.
80
 
The court addressed HACC’s argument that HUD regulations 
authorized it to deny Pickett a post-termination hearing.
81
 The court found 
this only makes sense where the participant passively allows the voucher 
to expire, which was not true in this case, as Pickett had actively tried to 
remain in the program.
82
  
The court also noted that HUD regulations require a PHA to provide a 
participant family an opportunity for a hearing when terminating program 
benefits on other grounds.
83
 Thus, this decision not to extend the term of 
the transfer voucher, which had the effect of ending Pickett’s participation 
in the voucher program, should be entitled to as much, if not greater, 
protection than other agency decisions. 
Finally, the court noted that HACC had denied Pickett an extension of 
her transfer voucher based on a “failure to act,” not because her request 
itself did not require an informal hearing.
84
 Consequently, due process and 
federal regulations would require HACC to provide a hearing when 
 
 
 77. Pickett, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 665. 
 78. Id. at 668. 
 79. Id. at 670. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See 24 C.F.R § 982.555(b)(4) (2002). 
 82. Pickett, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 668–69. 
 83. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(a)(i), (iv), and (v) (2002) (Such other grounds include: a decision to 
terminate based on a determination of the family’s discontinued income eligibility, a decision to 
terminate for a family’s “failure to act”, and a decision to terminate because the family has been absent 
from their rental unit.). 
 84. Pickett, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 669 (citing HACC’s letter to Pickett). 
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deciding to terminate Pickett from the voucher program.
85
 The court also 
found that a participant actively seeking housing, and in compliance with 
policies, has a legitimate expectation of remaining in the program. Thus, 
terminating her participation in the program would deprive her of her 
property interest in the voucher without a hearing, violating due process.
86
  
So, the court posited that either HACC terminated Pickett because she 
failed to act, which required a hearing under 24 C.F.R. § 952.555(a)(iv), or 
HACC terminated Pickett under circumstances where she had a legitimate 
expectation of continued participation, which required a hearing on due 
process principles.
87
 Therefore, Pickett was entitled to a hearing on any 
decision that ended her tenure.  
2. Count II: Housing Act of 1927 
The court also addressed HACC’s argument that it had discretion to 
deny a transfer voucher extension. The court noted that this discretion 
could not be used arbitrarily or capriciously.
88
 Here, Pickett was making 
every effort to comply with the requirements for the transfer voucher, and 
was unable to do so only due to circumstances she alleged were outside of 
her control. Thus, the court found that Pickett had a claim against HACC 
for “exercising its discretion arbitrarily and capriciously,” given the facts 
and the rationale HACC gave for its decision to terminate.
89
  
The result of this case was that the court ordered HACC to grant 
Pickett a proper pre-termination hearing before HACC could decide 
 
 
 85. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(a)(iv) (2002). 
 86. Pickett, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 670. The court also addressed the risk of irreparable harm that an 
improper decision to terminate benefits created for Pickett. Id. at 672–73. Particularly, because Pickett 
relied on the housing assistance to afford her rental unit, the Court cited its concern that Pickett would 
be unable to find suitable alternative housing without the Section 8 subsidy. Id. at 673. Furthermore, 
even if Pickett were able to obtain alternative housing, she would be forced to pay the full cost of the 
rental unit herself while the case was pending, causing economic injury as well. Id. at 672–73. 
 87. Id. at 670. 
 88. In general, “[a]n agency action, finding, or conclusion cannot be ‘arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law.’” Id. at 671 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). 
See, e.g., In re Application of Rivera, No. 2010-33479, 2010 BL 350051, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 
2010) (finding the PHA's decision not to reinstate petitioner's transfer voucher was not arbitrary or 
capricious because the PHA had “relied on its internal policies” and “provided a rational basis for its 
determination”). 
 89. Pickett, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 671. The court noted that Pickett had located not just one, but two 
acceptable units within the term of the transfer voucher. Thus, HACC’s rationale for terminating 
Pickett based on the fact that she had failed to locate any acceptable units was flawed and 
contradictory. The court also noted that HACC might have failed to follow its own procedures when it 
failed to suspend the term of Pickett’s transfer voucher after she submitted an application for a tenancy 
and was waiting on HACC’s approval. Id. See supra note 53 for the circumstances leading to the 
expiration of Pickett’s transfer voucher. 
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whether or not to terminate her housing subsidy. The court did not rule 
that Pickett’s termination was necessarily improper, or that HACC could 
not, upon the hearing’s completion, choose to terminate Pickett’s voucher 
once again.
90
 However, the importance of this opinion was that the court 
ruled due process had to be observed before Pickett’s voucher could be 
terminated, in accordance with constitutional principles. 
V. RELEVANCE OF PICKETT IN HOUSING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
A. Current Legal and Social Trends Within the Public Assistance Context 
Pickett is only the most recent case to raise a constitutional concern 
about the administrative procedures within the Section 8 voucher program. 
Voucher recipients and legal scholars alike have challenged the lack of 
due process within the administrative process in recent years.
91
 One 
explanation for this increased scrutiny within the housing context may be 
the recent housing crisis, and the resulting public and congressional focus 
on the need for, yet unavailability of, affordable housing. This may have 
caused a change in public understanding of housing as a luxury to housing 
as a constitutionally protected right.  
In 2014, for example, there were 46.7 million people living in poverty 
in the United States.
92
 This statistic has not changed significantly in the 
past four years.
93
 In contrast, only about 10 million citizens were able to 
participate in housing assistance programs in 2012,
94
 meaning only a 
 
 
 90. Ironically, the court denied Pickett’s motion for a preliminary injunction for immediate 
receipt of a transfer voucher, but addressed the risk of irreparable harm from denial of a hearing in 
regards to the multi-prong test for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 665, 673–74. In particular, the court 
noted a participant’s improper termination from the voucher program could result in difficulties 
locating new housing, difficulties locating affordable housing, and even homelessness, all of which 
were risks that the Pickett family faced on an immediate basis during litigation. Id. at 672–73. Thus, 
although the court ordered that HACC hold a pre-termination hearing to address Pickett’s termination, 
it did not require a reinstatement of Pickett’s voucher in the intervening time period. Id. 
 91. See, e.g., Lahny R. Silva, Criminal Histories in Public Housing, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 375, 388 
(2015) (arguing that while courts have traditionally deferred to local PHAs on admission decisions 
based on criminal history, recently there has been a shift in this deference). For a discussion of a 
similar trend that manifested in the 1960s within the public housing context, see Zmora, supra note 47, 
at 1966–68 (analyzing the emphasis on due process that occurred as a result of the judiciary’s decision 
to recognize public housing benefits as a protectable property interest). 
 92. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME 
AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2014 12 (Sept. 2015), http://www.census.gov/library/ 
publications/2015/demo/p60-252.html.  
 93. Id. 
 94. SHELLEY K. IRVING & TRACY A. LOVELESS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DYNAMICS OF 
ECONOMIC WELL-BEING: PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, 2009–2012: WHO GETS 
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quarter of those in need were actually served. This demonstrates the dire 
lack of affordable housing in the U.S. and thus the need to ensure that 
those entitled to receive housing assistance actually do so. 
Another rationale for this focus on constitutional protections for public 
assistance recipients may be the current social focus on fighting 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, immigration status, gender, 
and/or race.
95
 The recent Supreme Court decision recognizing disparate 
impact as a cause of action under the Fair Housing Act is a further 
indication that these concerns of discrimination are timely and important 
ones.
96
 
Legal scholar Goodwin Liu provides a philosophical rationale for this 
movement within the housing context, positing that judicial recognition 
and protection of welfare benefits will continuously change in a 
democratic society because constitutional doctrine is “properly informed 
by . . . the ongoing evolution of our fundamental values as reflected in our 
culture and politics.”97 Thus, as social sentiment toward welfare benefits 
as property rights changes over time, so will the judicial interpretation of 
those rights.
98
 So this current trend of challenging due process in the 
Section 8 voucher program may be the result of a shift in the public’s 
understanding and acceptance of the need for welfare benefits.
99
 If this 
hypothesis is true, then it is imperative that legal advocates take advantage 
of current public sentiment to push for substantive change within the 
welfare programs.  
 
 
ASSISTANCE? 22 (May 2015), http://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/ 
demo/p70-141.pdf. 
 95. See Thomas, supra note 47, at 33 (arguing that there is need for reform of the FHA in order 
to address instances of race discrimination within the housing context). 
 96. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 
(2015) (recognizing the importance of plaintiffs being able to address discriminatory intent and 
unconscious prejudices).  
 97. Goodwin Liu, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 203, 247 (2008).  
 98. Id. For a compelling argument in favor of recognizing housing as a fundamental right, see 
Shelby D. Green, Imagining a Right to Housing, Lying in the Interstices, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & 
POL’Y 393 (2012). 
 99. These constitutional issues are not limited to the Section 8 voucher program. Similar 
concerns have been raised regarding the Fair Housing Act. See generally Thomas, supra note 47 
(critiquing the Fair Housing Act, specifically its questionable constitutional authority and arguing that 
since the Fair Housing Act is vulnerable to constitutional challenge, it needs to be amended). Again, 
the recent Supreme Court decision interpreting the Fair Housing Act to include a disparate impact 
claim shows that there is a calling for greater accountability within the housing context. Tex. Dep’t of 
Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. 2507. 
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B. Due Process Concerns in Public Housing 
In the housing context, this trend has manifested in a number of ways. 
One example is the One-Strike Policy, which allows participants to be 
terminated from the housing program for a single criminal violation.
100
 
The termination procedures for these participants have been accused of 
violating constitutional procedures, as local PHAs often conduct these 
hearings without strict adherence to due process requirements.
101
 
Additionally, even outside the criminal context, some PHAs terminate 
families from the voucher program based on hearsay evidence alone.
102
 
These situations highlight the dangerous amount of discretion that local 
PHAs have in accepting families into or terminating them from the 
voucher program, and raise concerns about possible unchecked biases and 
prejudices that may be inherent in the administrative system. 
In every situation, legal and social advocates are seeking a remedy in 
the form of congressional action to amend HUD regulations to bring the 
regulations more in line with constitutional due process requirements.
103
 In 
the criminal context, advocates are asking Congress to require local PHAs 
to review each tenant’s individual circumstances before making a 
decision.
104
 For informal termination hearings, advocates argue that 
Congress should place restrictions on the use of evidence within 
termination hearings in accordance with due process procedures.
105
 These 
remedies are very similar to the decision reached by the Pickett court, 
which required an informal hearing in accordance with due process 
procedures before the participant’s voucher could be terminated.106 Again, 
 
 
 100. Zmora, supra note 47, at 1971–72 (discussing the One Strike policy). 
 101. Id. at 1985–86. Additionally, thousands of ex-offenders are being released from jails as a 
result of America’s attempt to remedy the harsh sentencing that occurred during the “War on Drugs.” 
Silva, supra note 91, at 375. These individuals require affordable housing and often end up in the 
public housing system. Id. at 376. This may explain why reentry scholars and even the American Bar 
Association have focused in recent years on improving the constitutional and administrative 
protections for these individuals in obtaining and keeping affordable housing. See, e.g., id. at 393. 
 102. Margaretta E. Homsey, Procedural Due Process and Hearsay Evidence in Section 8 Housing 
Voucher Termination Hearings, 51 B.C. L. REV. 517, 550 (2010) (noting that common evidence used 
in termination hearings includes phone calls, letters, police reports, and news articles containing 
hearsay). 
 103. For a discussion of how food stamp eligibility underwent a similar process in the 1970s, see 
Liu, supra note 97, at 255–60. Liu demonstrates that rather than interpreting the relevant statutes 
literally, the Supreme Court instead redefined food stamp eligibility in order to more fully achieve 
Congress’ policy goal. Id. at 258. 
 104. Zmora, supra note 47, at 1987. 
 105. See, e.g., Homsey, supra note 102, at 546–47. 
 106. Pickett v. Hous. Auth. of Cook Cty., 114 F. Supp. 3d 663, 674 (N.D. Ill. 2015). The court did 
not rule that the Pickett family was entitled to retain their housing voucher as a matter of law; rather, 
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this demonstrates that the Pickett decision is representative of the 
objectives of the current legal and social movements. 
Another due process concern that has been raised about the voucher 
program is the hearing termination officers’ qualifications.107 These 
officers, who have the responsibility of deciding whether to terminate a 
family’s vouchers, “are generally not legally trained.”108 This creates 
constitutional concerns on two fronts. First, the officers may not know 
evidentiary rules, a fact that creates due process concerns in itself.
109
 
Additionally, unlike judges, hearing officers may not be aware of program 
participants’ legal rights or the facts surrounding their case; thus, a 
decision may be made without regard to the legal or practical 
consequences for the participant.
110
 This lack of legal training may explain 
why so many constitutional concerns have been raised about the 
administrative procedures. 
Another issue that has been raised by legal scholars is the limited 
number of situations in which a voucher program participant has the right 
to an informal hearing.
111
 Oftentimes, the informal hearing may be a 
program participant’s only opportunity to raise due process or 
administrative process concerns. When this right is denied to them, 
participants who are wrongly terminated are left without legal recourse.
112
 
 
 
the court merely found that the PHA had to give Pickett an opportunity to be heard before termination 
could be considered. Id. 
 107. See Turner, supra note 5, at 50. 
 108. Id. at 50. Additionally, the termination officers are appointed by the local PHA, which may 
lead to a feeling of indebtedness by the officer to the PHA, making it much more difficult for the 
officer to be fair and just in resolving participant/PHA disputes. Id. at 50–51. 
 109. Id. For example, “most hearing termination officers in northern California are given 1–2 days 
of formal training that includes some training on the evidentiary rules attendant to the hearings and 
HUD/agency regulations and procedures.” Id. at n.32 (based on testimony from one hearing officer). 
 110. For an example of how a hearing officer’s lack of training may lead to constitutional 
violations, see also Carter v. Lynn Hous. Auth., 880 N.E.2d 778 (Mass. 2008) (holding that tenant’s 
due process rights were violated by hearing officer’s failure to consider all relevant facts and 
circumstances, failure to make any factual findings, and failure to use discretion in light of mitigating 
circumstances). 
 111. 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(a)(i)-(v) (2002) (situations in which an informal hearing is required 
include a decision to terminate for a family’s “failure to act,” a decision to terminate because the 
family has been absent from their rental unit, and a decision to terminate based on a determination of 
the family’s discontinued income eligibility). See also John M. Lerner, Private Rights Under the 
Housing Act: Preserving Rental Assistance for Section 8 Tenants, 34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 41, 50 
(2014) (“The list of decisions that must be given an opportunity for a hearing, however, is quite 
limited.”). In the context of housing quality standards, this means that participants do not have a right 
under HUD regulations to seek judicial review of a PHA’s decision. Id. at 51.  
 112. Lerner, supra note 111, at 75. Lerner advocates for an explicit private right so that 
participants can “challenge a housing authority’s termination of funding caused solely by a landlord’s 
failure to comply with the regulatory standards.” Id. at 74. This would allow participants to obtain 
judicial review of their case before they are wrongly removed from their homes.  
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This leads into the final due process concern within the voucher 
program being debated today. There is currently a lack of emphasis on the 
importance of legal counsel within the housing assistance program.
113
 This 
deficiency is important in light of the many legal and constitutional 
challenges currently being brought against local PHAs and HUD 
regulations.
114
 In Pickett, Pickett may not have even known she had a 
constitutionally protected right in her housing voucher if she had not 
consulted a legal aid lawyer. Attorneys’ involvement within welfare 
programs is essential in order to identify and address constitutional and 
due process concerns such as these.
115
  
The Pickett decision is representative of a growing legal and social 
movement that is challenging the constitutionality of the housing 
assistance program’s policies and regulations. There is a greater public 
awareness today of the many flaws within the housing assistance program. 
The Pickett decision, which recognizes the importance of due process 
within the context of the voucher program and provides a practical 
solution for protecting this property interest, demonstrates the type of 
substantive change for which legal scholars and program participants alike 
are currently advocating.  
VI. DISCUSSION OF PICKETT AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
A. Necessity of Pre-Termination Hearing 
It is important to recognize, nevertheless, that the Pickett court’s 
decision was a marked departure from the view held by courts that have 
previously considered this matter.
116
 While the Pickett court did not hold 
 
 
 113. See Risa E. Kaufman et al., The Interdependence of Rights: Protecting the Human Right to 
Housing by Promoting the Right to Counsel, 45 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 772, 811 (2014) 
(advocating the expansion of the right to housing by promoting the right to counsel within housing 
assistance programs). 
 114. Kaufman et al. argue that “access to counsel is critical to the successful expansion of the 
underlying right to be free of discrimination.” Id. at 811. Additionally, the authors raise due process 
arguments based on “the need to maintain equality in access to the courts.” Id. at 812. Again, this 
emphasizes the role that legal advocates must take in fighting for a housing assistance program that 
better protects the participants’ constitutional and due process rights. 
 115. Kaufman et al. also point out that “[i]ncorporating the due process arguments into the 
housing rights agenda, then, invites broader participation in the right to housing coalition by groups 
that are primarily concerned with procedural fairness and recognizes that, as a practical matter, 
housing rights are worth little if enforcement mechanisms perpetuate inequalities.” Id. at 813. See also 
Ammann, supra note 12, at 324–25 (advocating for attorney involvement with low-income families to 
ensure they receive and retain the public assistance that they deserve). 
 116. Pickett v. Hous. Auth. of Cook Cty., 114 F. Supp. 3d 663, 670 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“The 
court acknowledges that its ruling diverges from precedent in other circuits.”). See also Jackson v. 
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that the participant family had a de facto right to keep the transfer voucher, 
it did find that a pre-termination hearing was required before the PHA 
could terminate the voucher.
117
 This is inconsistent with prior courts’ 
decisions, which have held that a pre-termination hearing is not required to 
satisfy due process requirements.
118
  
However, previous courts may have been interpreting the federal 
regulations literally, rather than considering the goals of the housing 
assistance program, the individual participant’s circumstances, or the 
effects that implementing the regulation actually may have on the 
participant. For example, some courts have held that termination of a 
transfer voucher does not require an informal hearing because it is not one 
of the enumerated situations in the regulations where such a hearing is 
required before termination.
119
 While this may be a literal interpretation of 
the regulations, these courts have not considered, as the Pickett court did, 
whether that interpretation is consistent with the principle that a housing 
voucher is a protected property interest.
120
 If a court accepts the principle 
that a housing subsidy or housing voucher is a constitutionally protected 
property interest, then any unexpected termination of that property interest 
should be protected by due process procedures.
121
  
B. Dangers of a Wrongful Voucher Termination 
The purpose of recognizing a property interest in a housing subsidy is 
so the voucher cannot be revoked without proper due process, as the 
voucher holder has a reasonable expectation that he will retain the 
 
 
Wilmington Hous. Auth., No. 7:13-CV-155-BO, 2014 WL 2506151 (E.D.N.C. June 3, 2014) (holding 
participant’s property rights expired upon receipt of the transfer voucher); In re Application of Rivera, 
No. 2010-33479, 2010 BL 350051 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 2010) (finding the Housing Authority's 
decision not to extend the term of petitioner’s transfer voucher was not arbitrary or capricious, and 
thus was permissible). 
 117. Pickett, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 674. 
 118. See Ely v. Mobile Hous. Bd., 13 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1227–28 (S.D. Ala. 2014) (holding 
participant did not have property interest after transfer voucher expired and thus was not entitled to 
due process hearing); Burgess v. Alameda Hous. Auth., 98 Fed. App’x 603, 605 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(finding no property interest in the transfer voucher). 
 119. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.555(a) (2002). See also Augusta v. Cmty. Dev. Corp. of Long Island, 
No. 07–CV–0361 (JG) (ARL), 2008 WL 5378386, at *6–7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2008) (holding 
participant’s termination from the program for expired voucher does not require a hearing under the 
regulations); In re Application of Gwynn, No. 06350–03, 2003 WL 22134901 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 21, 
2003) (holding federal regulations did not require a pre-termination hearing and finding expiration of a 
transfer voucher was not a valid cause of action for a constitutional violation). 
 120. Pickett, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 667–68. 
 121. In fact, the Pickett court ruled that HACC’s basis for terminating Pickett’s participation in the 
voucher program was unconstitutional. Id. at 670. 
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voucher.
122
 However, local PHAs currently have complete and unilateral 
discretion as to whether to approve or deny an extension of the transfer 
voucher.
123
 It is important to have legal checks in place when this amount 
of discretion is given to an administrative body.
124
 Courts recognize 
property interests and “require due process only to minimize substantially 
‘unfair and mistaken deprivations’ of entitlements conferred by law.”125 
This “means that a court will provide due process safeguards only when 
the government inaccurately distributes benefits.”126 When a welfare 
recipient has improperly had his benefits revoked or terminated, this 
“implies that the government is not properly distributing benefits.”127 This 
level of discretion also raises concerns—especially within the welfare 
program—of inherent race, gender, or class-based bias in benefit 
distribution and termination.
128
  
Additionally, this creates an immediate danger for Section 8 
participants requesting transfer vouchers, as participants may not be aware 
that if their transfer voucher expires, their participation in the program is 
terminated.
129
 Alternatively, even if participants are aware of the potential 
 
 
 122. See Simmons v. Drew, 716 F.2d 1160, 1162 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 123. This discretion remains subject to the court’s finding that the PHA’s decision to terminate 
was not arbitrary or capricious. See In re Application of Rivera, No. 2010-33479, 2010 BL 350051 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 2010). Additionally, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Tex. Dep’t of Hous. 
& Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) to allow disparate impact claims 
within the context of the Fair Housing Act may also give rise to such claims in the context of Section 8 
housing decisions. The judiciary currently seems more willing to explore the possibility of 
unconscious discriminatory intent. This may lead to more challenges in the future by program 
participants against their local PHA’s use of discretion in approving and terminating program benefits. 
This could serve as an additional internal check on the decision-making process. But see Lerner, supra 
note 111, at 72 (“[I]t is unclear whether disparate impact claims will be an adequate substitute for an 
explicit private right.”).  
 124. A model of how this discretion can be checked would be the application process for the 
voucher program. There, HUD provides guidelines to the local PHAs as to what information is 
relevant, what information can be considered, and how to weigh this information to make an informed 
decision. See generally Silva, supra note 91 (discussing admission guidelines in the context of ex-
criminal program applicants).  
 125. Beth R. Greenberg, Are Applicants for Section 8 Housing Subsidies Entitled to the Benefits, 
1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 757, 778 (1985).  
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 779. 
 128. While there are officers who act as checks on the system by reviewing decisions to ensure 
neutrality, these actors often work for or with the local PHA themselves, raising questions of their 
ability to effectively remain unbiased in their review. Turner, supra note 5, at 50–51. 
 129. A family whose housing assistance benefits are revoked must reapply to the voucher 
program. This is not a short process; the wait for a particular voucher program may be several years. 
For many families, such a long wait is not economically feasible. For a discussion of the current state 
of local PHAs, see, e.g., Joe Augustine, Section 8 Housing Options Limited in Richfield, ABC KSTP 
(Nov. 14, 2015). Of the 36,000 people who applied to the Section 8 program in the Ritchfield area, 
only 2,000 were placed on the waiting list. Those on the waiting list will expect to wait about a year 
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loss of their housing subsidy, this creates extremely high stakes for 
moving, which may discourage participants from doing so.
130
 The loss of a 
Section 8 voucher can be economically devastating for a participant 
family, leading to an inability to pay for food or medical care.
131
 
Furthermore, since participants often need the Section 8 voucher to afford 
housing, “loss of a subsidy combined with the virtual impossibility of 
finding affordable housing on short notice is almost certain to lead to 
homelessness.”132 
This issue becomes even more significant in light of the position that 
some courts have taken that a family’s participation in the voucher 
program is terminated upon their receipt of a transfer voucher. If this 
argument holds true, then a family could not move residences without 
losing their housing subsidies at least temporarily; while they are in 
possession of the transfer voucher, they no longer enjoy the rights and 
benefits of a voucher program participant. This creates a greater risk that 
the family may lose their benefits permanently because they are not 
entitled to the same protections they would be as actual participants. This 
interpretation is contrary to HUD’s objective to improve families’ living 
situations.
133
 
 
 
and a half to actually receive benefits. Id. As a result of these long waiting lists, it is possible that some 
families may choose to remain in unsafe or uninhabitable housing rather than risk losing their benefits 
by applying for a transfer voucher. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 264 (1970) (discussing the 
practical implications for a participant whose aid is terminated pending resolution of a dispute over 
eligibility). 
 130. This may discourage participant families from moving even when their living conditions are 
uninhabitable. This issue of the commonality of poor living conditions in public housing has been 
addressed in other areas of the HUD Voucher Program. See Lerner, supra note 111, at 49–51 
(discussing the prevalence of poor housing conditions for Section 8 participants and the likelihood that 
participants will lose their benefits as a result of those conditions); Ammann, supra note 12, at 311–12 
(documenting the average waiting times for Section 8 housing vouchers in various jurisdictions); 
DeLuca et al., supra note 24, at 1–2.  
 131. Turner, supra note 5, at 49. 
 132. Id. For a discussion of the importance of recognizing a property interest in housing subsidies, 
see Curtis Berger, Beyond Homelessness: An Entitlement to Housing, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 315 
(1991). Additionally, since HUD regulations currently do not require an informal hearing when a 
participant is terminated for his landlord’s failure to comply with regulations, see 24 C.F.R. 
§ 982.555(b)(6) (2002), landlords have little incentive to ensure that their units meet regulatory 
standards. For a discussion of the current substandard condition of many Section 8 apartments, see 
Lerner, supra note 111, at 65–66. This contributes to a voucher holder’s difficulty in obtaining suitable 
housing within the voucher term that meets his local PHA’s approval. 
 133. See Lerner, supra note 111, at 49 (discussing the advantages of mobility within the voucher 
program, including a family’s ability to relocate with their “changing needs”). Additionally, poor 
mobility for participant families “contribute[s] to the prevalence of housing segregation” within 
communities. Id. at 66. “Whereas HUD and the housing authorities cannot be blamed for the 
community barriers, they do little to encourage voucher recipients to search for housing in better 
quality areas.” Id. 
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At a minimum, local PHAs should grant an informal hearing such as 
the one required by the Pickett court. Without a due process hearing, a 
participant is unable to explain his failure to acquire new housing within 
the transfer voucher term. In the case of Pickett, where the local PHA’s 
actions might have caused or contributed to the participant’s lack of 
success,
134
 this hearing becomes even more important if an unjust 
termination is to be avoided.
135
 For this reason, HUD itself has 
acknowledged the importance of a hearing when the local PHA is making 
a final decision on a participant’s benefits, in order to correct any 
decisional error the PHA may have committed.
136
 Outside of an informal 
hearing, it may be impossible for a participant to raise these arguments. 
Furthermore, if the local PHA is able to revoke the voucher without 
satisfying due process, this is inconsistent with the purpose of recognizing 
a property interest in the voucher in the first place.
137
 
One of the goals of the voucher program, and the American welfare 
program in general, is to help families better themselves by providing 
resources and opportunities that they may lack, so that they have a chance 
at economic advancement.
138
 The ability of a participant family to move to 
 
 
 134. See Pickett v. Hous. Auth. of Cook Cty., 114 F. Supp. 3d 663, 666 (N.D. Ill. 2015). The 
Pickett court noted that the CHA failed to suspend the terms of Pickett’s transfer voucher while her 
submission for housing approval was pending. Id. at 671. Without the opportunity to present this 
argument in an informal hearing, there would be no check on the PHA’s own failure to follow internal 
regulations, resulting in an improper termination of benefits. Id. 
 135. Section 8 vouchers are also extended to many tenants who have limited English proficiency. 
These tenants may have additional difficulties obtaining alternative housing due to their limited 
language skills, such as their inability to understand notices from the PHA or their difficulty 
communicating with potential landlords. To deny these tenants the opportunity to appear before the 
PHA and communicate their difficulties would create a great injustice in the system. For a more 
detailed analysis of the obstacles that tenants with limited English proficiency face, see Kuehnhoff, 
supra note 40. 
 136. This need for a check on the local PHA’s authority has been recognized by HUD in the 
guidebook it publishes for local PHAs on implementing the federal regulations. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. 
& URBAN DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING OCCUPANCY GUIDEBOOK (June 2003), http://www.hud.gov/offices/ 
pih/programs/ph/rhiip/phguidebooknew.pdf. See also Turner, supra note 5, at 49 (discussing inherent 
biases within the decision-making process). 
 137. For a discussion of the importance of recognizing a property interest in housing subsidies, see 
generally Berger, supra note 132. 
 138. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, 
classified welfare benefits as “devices to aid security and independence.” Id. at 262 n.8. Additionally, 
Justice Brennan noted: 
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a better neighborhood is important because it may provide them with 
health, social, or educational benefits.
139
 The local PHA should make 
every effort to protect participants, including those seeking to move to a 
new housing location. As courts have recognized, public assistance 
recipients may lack the legal or literary knowledge to protect themselves; 
thus, it is necessary for the local PHA to assume that role.
140
 
C. Appropriate Judicial and Legislative Response 
Since the procedure regarding transfer vouchers has been defined by 
federal regulations and has been interpreted by courts, either legislative or 
judicial action is needed to rectify this unconstitutional process.
141
 First, 
courts should recognize the constitutional violation that has been raised by 
the regulations, and should follow the lead of the Pickett court by 
requiring a pre-termination hearing.
142
 This would protect participants’ due 
 
 
Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the 
poor the same opportunities that are available to others to participate meaningfully in the life 
of the community. At the same time, welfare guards against the societal malaise that may 
flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration and insecurity. Public assistance, then, 
is not mere charity, but a means to “promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of 
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” 
Id. at 265.  
 139. Turner, supra note 5, at 49 (2011) (“[V]ouchers may give low-income families the 
opportunity to move to neighborhoods with less poverty, less criminal activity and better schools.”).  
 140. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970) (requiring a hearing rather than written 
submissions for due process procedures so that welfare participants who lack the writing skills to 
express the situation are given full constitutional protections). 
 141. It is necessary for courts to initiate a judicial response to this issue because litigants in these 
cases are usually participants of the Section 8 voucher program, meaning they are receiving financial 
assistance in order to make their housing payments. So, by virtue of their situation, these litigants will 
almost always be financially unable to retain an attorney to represent them. Thus, courts cannot rely on 
attorneys to recognize the constitutional issue and present it before the court; instead, some form of 
judicial activism will be needed. For a further discussion of how the financial limitations of Section 8 
participants affect outcomes in termination hearings, see Turner, supra note 5, at 51. For a discussion 
of the judicial role in determining constitutional rights, see Liu, supra note 97, at 252 (positing that the 
judiciary has a role in recognizing social movement, which “authorizes courts, when applying broad 
constitutional guarantees such as equal protection or due process, to identify and interpret the 
normative principles that guide extant welfare policies and to use those principles as a basis for 
assessing the validity of program eligibility criteria, procedures for terminating or reducing benefits, 
or unequal or inadequate levels of benefit provision”) (emphasis added).  
 142. But see Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 
48 UCLA L. REV. 443 (2001) (analyzing the effectiveness of policy lawyering and suggesting an 
alternative model called “law and organizing”: a community based approach to progressive lawyering 
that combines legal advocacy and grassroots action). It is worth noting that even the requirement of a 
pre-termination hearing will not rectify due process violations currently prevalent in the system. Since 
the local PHA selects the termination officers to oversee these informal hearings, there is a lack of 
objectivity in the way the hearings are conducted and decided. Additionally, the litigants in these 
hearings are recipients of Section 8 housing benefits, who are often in a difficult financial position. 
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process rights by providing them the right to be heard before their benefits 
can be revoked completely by the local PHA.
143
 Yet, this would still allow 
local PHAs to deny an extension of a transfer voucher when justified, as 
there are cases where the participant has demonstrated bad faith in failing 
to obtain appropriate housing. 
Second, courts should recognize that a participant’s property rights in 
his Section 8 benefits do not expire when he is issued a transfer 
voucher.
144
 The mere decision to move from one Section 8 approved living 
situation to another should not cause a family to lose their protected status 
as a program participant.
145
 If courts were to recognize that a participant’s 
property interest in benefits continues even after the issuance of a transfer 
voucher, then logically, the participant’s right to a due process pre-
termination hearing will be triggered.
146
 
 
 
Thus, many participants attend these hearings without the benefit of legal counsel, who may be able to 
frame the situation differently or bring legal arguments of which the participants are unaware. For a 
further discussion of the inherent injustice in termination hearings, see Turner, supra note 5, at 49–52. 
 143. See Robyn Minter Smyers, High Noon in Public Housing: The Showdown Between Due 
Process Rights and Good Management Practices in the War on Drugs and Crime, 30 URB. LAW. 573 
(1998) (discussing the importance of due process procedures to protect participants from unjustly 
losing their program benefits); Lerner, supra note 111, at 74–75 (advocating for granting tenants the 
right to private action to challenge landlord wrongdoing, in order to prevent participant families from 
wrongly being removed from their housing while the dispute is being resolved). 
 144. See Jackson v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., No. 7:13-CV-155-BO, 2014 WL 2506151 
(E.D.N.C. June 3, 2014) (finding participant’s property rights expired upon receipt of the transfer 
voucher); Burgess v. Alameda Hous. Auth., 98 Fed. App’x 603 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding no property 
interest in the transfer voucher). But see Burgess v. Hous. Auth. of Alameda Cty., No. C01-04098 
MJJ, 2006 WL 7347315 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2006). While judicial deference to the legislature would 
be appropriate if Congress had made a conscious decision to limit a participant family’s due process 
rights, such a decision seems to be lacking here. Instead, “[t]he less evidence there is that the 
legislature has made a conscious and considered policy choice, the less deference the product of the 
legislative process is entitled to receive in the courts.” Liu, supra note 97, at 259. In the past, when the 
Court acted as interpreters of welfare rights, “the Court began its analysis by identifying the broad, 
expressly stated purpose of the welfare program and treated that purpose as a deliberate, democratic 
expression of public values to which implementing provisions are presumed to be aligned.” Id. at 263. 
 145. A family’s protected interest in their Section 8 benefits should not depend on which “stage” 
in the process they are in. Thus, their shift from participants with already approved Section 8 housing 
to participants searching for new Section 8 housing should not cause a loss of benefits. See Ressler v. 
Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming applicants for Section 8 benefits must be 
afforded Fifth Amendment due process protection in the application and selection process). See also 
Stefanie DeLuca et al., supra note 24, at 1–2 (discussing the need to improve mobility and portability 
for families within the Section 8 voucher program); POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, 
THE URBAN INST., EXPANDING CHOICE: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING A SUCCESSFUL 
HOUSING MOBILITY PROGRAM (2013), http://www.prrac.org/pdf/ExpandingChoice.pdf (giving 
solutions to mobility problems within local PHAs in order to promote mobility and deconcentrate 
poverty). 
 146. See Simmons v. Drew, 716 F.2d 1160, 1164 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that the local PHA was 
constitutionally required to grant participant a hearing before it expelled her because participant had a 
property right in the housing voucher).  
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In turn, this judicial interpretation of the federal regulations as 
unconstitutional may lead to a legislative response to amend the 
regulations.
147
 The judiciary often acts as “interpreters of social norms,” 
and will change the law in accordance with the shift in normality that it 
sees in the American culture.
148
 This provides an opportunity for the 
legislature to respond. Here, the legislature should revoke 24 C.F.R. 
§ 982.555(b)(4), which allows the PHA the discretion to choose not to 
approve an extension of the transfer voucher term without providing the 
participant with an opportunity for an informal hearing.
149
 Instead, 
Congress should recognize the importance of protecting participants’ 
property interest in housing vouchers by ensuring that due process 
procedures are implemented. By requiring a pre-termination hearing, 
Congress could limit the risk that participant families will be wrongfully 
terminated from the voucher program. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There is an inherent contradiction between courts’ recognition of a 
property interest in a housing voucher while also allowing this voucher to 
be unilaterally terminated without satisfaction of due process procedural 
requirements. There is evidence that this matter is not yet settled in the 
courts, and Pickett may demonstrate a judicial movement toward 
recognizing that informal pre-termination hearings are necessary to protect 
participants’ constitutional rights.150  
 
 
 147. Although it is possible for HUD to address these concerns internally, there are several 
reasons why a legislative response would produce a better result. First, HUD may address these 
complaints by merely initiating a compliance review of one of its funding recipients. Kuehnhoff, supra 
note 40, at 243. With respect to the Pickett case, given the sheer number of complaints against the 
Chicago Housing Authority (CHA), it would be logical for HUD to begin with a review of the CHA’s 
compliance with its own internal policies, as well as HUD regulations and policies. However, because 
the CHA has an internal policy of disallowing informal hearings for transfer voucher terminations, it is 
not technically in violation of any internal or external regulations. See supra note 16, HOUSING 
CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN 5–6 (“[t]he PHA’s decision to deny a request for 
an extension of the voucher term is not subject to informal review”). What is really at stake here is 
whether such an internal policy is in violation of constitutional principles. This is a matter better 
addressed by the judiciary or the legislature. See also Liu, supra note 97, at 253–55 (recognizing that 
the legislature, as the people’s representative, may be better suited for addressing shifts in social values 
than the judiciary).  
 148. Liu, supra note 97, at 255, 259 (recognizing that “judicial review can promote transparency 
and rationality in the legislative process without imposing rigid boundaries on legislative outcomes”). 
 149. Since failure to obtain approval of suitable housing within the voucher term is a “failure to 
act” by the participant, this situation should be recognized under 24 CFR § 982.555(a)(1)(iv) where a 
pre-termination hearing is not required. 
 150. Since the Pickett decision, at least thirteen separate complaints have been filed (by the same 
legal assistance attorney) in Cook County Circuit Court, a lower court in the Northern District of 
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Additionally, the Pickett decision may be representative of a larger 
trend toward greater accountability and transparency within the housing 
assistance program in order to combat instances of discrimination or abuse 
of discretion. If courts recognize this public concern about the lack of due 
process, this provides an opportunity for rulings that align with shifting 
social norms, which have emphasized the importance of recognizing 
housing assistance as a protectable property right. However, since case law 
is yet unsettled on this matter, and the majority of district courts have 
ruled contrary to Pickett, there is a present and immediate danger of 
program participants losing program benefits without due process 
protections. Program participants and legal advocates alike must continue 
to challenge the law and PHA practices in this area in order to bring about 
substantive, lasting change. 
Amanda R. Engel

 
 
 
Illinois, These cases allege similar factual patterns and constitutional violations, as well as violations 
of the local CHA Administrative Plan. The fact that these cases have been filed in spite of the CHA’s 
decision not to give tenants the right to a hearing demonstrates that there are growing concerns about a 
lack of due process protections for participants within the voucher program. As of the publishing of 
this Note, not all of these cases have been decided. Even so, their existence suggests that other 
practitioners have recognized the opportunity presented by the Pickett decision and are seeking to 
solidify the court’s decision. See, e.g., Complaint, Hughes v. Chicago Hous. Auth., No. 2015-CH-
12260 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Aug. 14, 2015). 
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